The Post-PC 
Introduction
Internet services for electronic coininuiiicatioii and commerce have permeated our society. People routincly access and cxchange private atid scnsitive information when they use Internet services, such as electronic mail, tlic World-Wide Web, clcctronic banking, on-line shopping, Ecornincrce, and stock trading. At the same timc, we are moving into a "Post-PC" cra, where pcoplc use many dilferent types of clcvices to access these Internet scrvices, including pay-per-use public Internet kiosks, laptops, PDAs, 0-7695-0816-2/00 $10.00 0 2000 IEEE cellular telephones, and two-way pagers, each with different characteristics and capabilities. Three critical requirements for users of Internct scrvices in these Post-PC environments are secure access to information, dynamic content adaptation. and the fusion of multiple devices. The fusion of multiple devices rcpresents an extension of the split trust model [5] where multiplc devices work in tandem. Meeting these requirements will prescrvc the privacy and integrity o l users' transactions and enable the use of new and interesting services and acccss devices.
Secure, wide-area access to information is of paramount importancc on thc Internet, but existing solutions do not address Post-PC requirements (e.g., traffic can bc intercepted and user identities can be forged). Protection against such attacks is provided by strong authentication and end-to-end encryption. A user's trusted application establishes a secure connection to the service of interest. For example, when accessing a secure web-based banking scrvicc, the user's web browser establishes a secure connection to thc web server by using HTTP over Secure Socket Layer (SSL) [24] .
The cxisting security model makes two basic assumptions: first, that both the user's access device and the software running oii it can he trusted not to intercept or send private information elsewhere; second, the access device has thc computational resources to secure the connection (e.g., to perform public key SSL operations) and to clisplay the service's content (e.g., to render complex color graphics). While these assumptions arc reasonable for users o l private desktop computers, they do not hold for Post-PC devices, where users access services from both untrustcd devices (such as public kiosks), and devices with limitcd resources (such as PDAs).
Untrusted kiosks arc problematic for secure Internet scrvices, a s all scrvicc data is available in uncncrypted forin to the kiosk. Possible attacks inay hc as straightforward as rccording all kcystrokcs (e.g., Pcrsonal Identification Numbers, passwords, and login information), or as suhtlc as rccording users' personal information for Iatcr lraudulcnt use (e.g., account numbers). Additionally, a kiosk can "hijack" a secure connection and perform activc attacks (e.g., make bank transfcrs or scnd forged e-mails). Untrustcd endpoints should not bc allowed to see a user's pcrsonal information; instead, the content value cvsiich data nust be reduced. Likewisc, acccss to sensitive service functionality from these endpoints must also bc guarded.
PDAs arc also problematic because they arc generally low-powcr, computationally-limited deviccs with lirnited memory and nctworking capabilities. To pcrform the industry-standard SSL handshake phase on onc such device, a 3Com Palm Pilot V [33] rcquircs several seconds. This latency imposes an intolcrablc delay for connection sctup, which is particularly undesirable if network connectivity is intcrmittent. An SSL implementation that uscs elliptic curve cryptography [SI is fcasible on a Palm Pilot V, hut few Internet services support that option. Moreover, evcn if a PDA is capablc of performing SSL, one may still opt for a protocol that is fastcr and more power-efficient. Finally, entering data to fill out forms using a pen-based intcrfacc is tcdious at best and even more cumbcrsomc using number pads on devices such as cellular telcphoncs.
Dcmand lor continuous access to Intcrnct content is increasing and Internet serviccs arc bccoining available in new environments such as automohilcs [26] and kiosks in airplane scats [25] . These environments demand multimodal access to content cithcr through traditional HTML, PDA thin client browsers, WML enabled phones, and voice.
We propose the use of a trusted infrastructurc-based proxy scrvice to provide secure multi-modal access to Internct service content from any device. An advantagc of this proxy-based approach is thc laycr of indircction it provides which allows transparent support for widely deployed systcms owned and operated by others. For untrusted terminals, scnsitive user information is removed from the information stream going to the terminal. For cxample, rcal names and account numbcrs can bc screened out. The proxy also mediates access to thc servicc by filtering control data in order to limit allowablc actions (e.g., disallowing all stock trades on untrustcd kiosks). For access lrom computationally-limited devices, the proxy scrvicc transcodes the security protocol into one which is more clficicntly exccutcd on thc device. Additionally, the proxy can distill thc scrvice contcnt into a format more suitable for the devicc [ 161. For example, a HTML service can he rendered as WML for a WAP enable phone, or even as voice.
A drawback of the proxy approach is that it requires users to placc a significant amount of trust in thc proxy infrastructure. The components in the infrastructurc require access to all data flowing through them to perform filtering and adaptation transformations. Additionally, users are rcquired to store private information and preferences in the infrastructure to enable these operations. This trust can be mcdiated by colocating the proxy with a particular Internet servicc in which the user already has established trust of scnsitivc information. For example, an Internct e-mail or stock-trading service can provide its own proxy scrvicc for access from mobile deviccs and public terminals. Altcrnatcly, the proxies can he treated as orthogonal to the scrvices which they enable access; a user necd only establish an account with a secure multi-modal proxy provider, much as they do with an Internet service provider today.
In addition to enabling basic access, our security proxy can bc used to combine the capabilities of both untrusted public terminals and mobile pcrsonal devices. For example, the limited GUI of a PDA can he supplemented by the richer, larger display of a public kiosk, while the PDA is used only for sensitive operations. The security proxy splits trust bctwccn the PDA and the public terminal by fusing thc devices together to provide onc logical channel with secure access to the end service. Consider thc case of users accessing their stock trading accounts from public access terminals. Instead of relying on the terminal to protect their secure information, the users could direct private or sensitivc information (e.g., portfolio value and account information) to their portable device, while using the GUI capabilities of the public terminal to initiate requests and display generic stock information (e.g., stock pricc fluctuations and historical graphs). The users initiate trading operations through thc untrusted public terminals and then confirm them using their trusted portable devices. The connections to the mobile devices can bc provided by the environment (e.g., kiosks with infrared network connections for PDAs) or by the deviccs (e.g., receiving a call on a cell-phone, or a message on a two-way pager). The proxy allows data to he encrypted with a protocol more appropriate for the capahilitics of computationally limited and power constrained small devices such as elliptical curve or shared key techniques. This capability bridges the gap to existing services that do not currently provide this option for smaller devices.
Wc prescnt a secure proxy architecture that:
Protects users from untrustcd access points.
Enables users to use untrusted acccss points in tandem with trusted mobile devices for security-enhanced service interactions.
Allows users to use the access device of their choice rcgardless of the device's computational abilities.
Simplifies the tailoring a service to multiple device formats to simple content authoring of style sheets and scraping scripts.
Our secure proxy incorporates a component-oriented, rule-based architecture which minimizcs the amount of service-specific codc that must he written. In particular, service developers (and users) can specify security rules that make the appropriate modifications to the data and control actions flowing in both directions betwecn the user and the scrvice. Adding support for new services only requires authoring a XML representation of the scmantic content and a WehL script to cxtract the content from thc servicc. Adding support lor new devices is donc simply through XSL stylesheets that render the content to the devices' format.
Architecture
In this section, we present an overview of our architecture for an infrastructure-based proxy for secure multimodal access to Internet service content, followed by a detailed design discussion of each componcnt.
Design overview
Our sccurc proxy for multi-modal access to Internet services consists of a few building block components and the canonical path hetwccn thcin. The proxy provides a secure level of indirection that can be uscd to modify contcnt flowing between clients and services. It is a component-based system for creating customizable building blocks that control and modify users' conncctious to secure scrvices. These components can easily bc composed together to bridge the gap betwccn traditional services and Post-PC dcviccs that have different trust levels and to simplify the process of adding support for new services and devices. This inodcl providcs a partitioning of computation that allows the components to he placed in a scalahle, fault-tolerant, and highlyavailable execution environment such as [20] that mccts the critical rcquircments of Intcrnct-scale serviccs.
Our architecture allows thc user to takc on different trust projiles based upon the location, dcvice, capabilitics, or trust in an access device. For example, thcse profiles include connecting from home devices (fully trusted), work computers (partially trusted), public terminals (not trusted), PDAs (trusted, hut not powerful), or with a untrustcd dcvicc in tandem with a trusted one (split-trust).
By dividing the functionality of our architccture into structural and semantic transformations, it is rclativcly casy to add new scrviccs and dcviccs. Format tmnsfornrutions adapt content to device capabilities (e.g., changing thc rcsolution, color deplh, or encoding format of an image), while sernantic transjurniutions protcct users' data and prcvcnt various actions from being perforincd from untrusted cnd devices. Additionally, the usc or rule-based components to add servicc-specific semantics to generic transformations simplifics thc incorporation 01' new services.
Thc architccturc consists of thc following components:
Security Adaptors (SA): Thcsc coinpoiicnts bridge the gap betwccn the secure access protocol required by a service (server-side) and access deviccs (client-side). Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of our proxy. Each component unifies a collection of devices or protocols into one format, isolating scrvicc-specific details from thc logical operations required to transform data. This abstraction capability becomes incrcasingly important as the number of devices and services grows. A new device or service can be enabled by simply creating a fcw dcvicc-specific componcnts, casing coinposability vcrsus modern vertical webbascd applications that rcquire service authors to individually tailor scrviccs to each end devicc. Our proxy simplifies the delivery of content to multiple devices by: reducing it to the task of authoring style sheets to rendcr content, and delivcring thc content through building block components that are implemented oncc to support a spccificd security or Internet protocol. Without these abstractions, authoring is an N x M task, where the introduction of a new device type requires changes to every service to add support lor the device and vice versa (e.g., web-clipping [l]).
Security Adaptors (SA)
Security Adaptors allow devices capable of performing one security protocol to access services that requirc a different protocol. Consider a mobile user with a low-power device capable of shared-key authentication and Blowfish [34] encryption, but not capable of performing thc complex computations required by SSL [24] . However, a service may only support authenticated access over SSL. In this case, the client-side Security Adaptor is a shared-key adaptor that obtains a user's key from the Identity Service and uses it to perform challenge-response authentication and to encrypt all communication with the client. The server side Security Adaptor communicates with the end service over SSL. Security Adaptors must be trusted as they have access to unenerypted user and service data and authenticate users, services, and devices to the infrastructure.
When connecting from an untrusted public key encryption-capable device, users authenticate themselves to the infrastructure using a pseudonym identity that idcntifies the trust profile and access device, and a one-time use password mechanism (e.g., S/K!3Y or SecurID [29, 19, 131) . This information does not need to be hidden from the untrusted endpoint as it can only he used once.
Additionally, the client-side Security Adaptor can provide persistent connections, even if the service does not provide them, enabling a client to establish a secure connection to the infrastructure once, while the infrastructure (potentially) establishes multiple connections to the service. If the connection setup time or round trip latency is high, this technique will yield a substantial performance improvement. Also, the infrastructure can establish multiple connections to different services to aggregate idormation (e.g., to perform a meta-search of multiple web sites).
Format Transcoders (FT)
Format Transcoders (FTs) transform data between external service and device formats and the FCM's XMLbased language, abstracting service-and device-specific information from the FCM. There are two types of Format Transcoders: server-side FTs and client-side FTs.
Server-Side Format Transcoders
The server-side Format Transcoder receives a service's content and transcodes it into an XML [8] representation of the semantic data. We choose XML as it is the industry standard technology for semantic mark up. Additionally, the XSL [ 151 presentation standard, which separates content from presentation, allows us to render thc XML represcntation to any device format. Our architecture allows content authors to choose the XML represcntation of their choice, enabling authors to provide multi-modal acccss to scrvices without waiting for service providers to agree on a standard XML DTD for their content.
The proxy extracts a service's semantic representation using "screen scraping'". Scraping is a service-specific operation, so each site requires its own content cxtraction scripts. The server-side Format Trascoder is a generic execution environment for these scripts.
By abstracting the logic for scraping service content into scripts, we create a single place where all scrvice-specific code is located and enable the FT component to he gcnerically rcused across multiple services. By semantically tagging data the FCM can apply rules, based on the user's current trust profile, to these tags and appropriately modify the data.
The author of the server-side Format Transcoder scraping script must identify the semantic content of displayed data and the actions that can be performed by a service. For web-based services, this is a substantial task that requires manual analysis. Tools such as WebL [ 121 help to automate this task. Products such as Epicentric portal server 1141 and Cohera [ 101 include web-scraping building blocks.
When operating on data flowing towards a service, the format transformation merely transforms the XML representations of control actions (e.g., HTTP POST or GET rcquests for web pages, or RMI for Java based services) into the services' target format. The code to perform these operations is reusable across inultiple services.
Client-Side Format Transcoders
Client-side Format Transcoders perform transformations on data flowing to and from the client into and out of the FCM's XML representation. As data travels to a service, HTTP POST and GET requests, RMI calls, etc. are transformed by the client-side Format Transcoder into an XML representation that can he operated on by the FCM to apply control filtering rules.
Consider, for example, the buy requcst that a user would execute in the stock trading scenario. The original HTTP POST request is translated into a representation where each form item is given a semantic XML tag. Additionally, the intermediate XML format allows HTTP based clients to access RMI based services and vice versa.
For data traveling to the client, the client-side Format Transcoder uses XSL style sheets to render the thc FCMmodified XML for the particular end device. Using XSL 'Extracting inforination from a wcb pagc's HTML code gives content authors a standard tool to tailor the presentation to the device format.For the stock trading example, the format for the kiosk is HTML, while the format for the PDA could be WML, a thin client browser format, or another custom format.
Filter and Control Modifier (FCM)
The FCM implements application-level logic for adapting data flowing between devices and services to the desired security parameters by applying the rules associated with users' current trust profiles to perform content and control filtering on the XML representation of the semantic content.
The FCM also applies rules for split-trust control functionality, where a trusted portable device is used to authorize and authenticate actions from an untrustcd device.
2.4.1
Infrastructure content filters alter or remove sensitive service content before it reaches the untrusted devicc, effectively decreasing the data's privacy or security level.
The FCM applies the user's rules by matching each XML tag to the appropriate rule, and performing the specified action. In order for a data item on the page to he displayed, the security level at which it can he rendered must he explicitly specified by the user's trust profile. This requirement follows the principle of least privilege.
There are six types of rules for data value reduction: allow-content, hide, obfuscate-well-known, olifuscatemapping, obfuscate-form, and obfuscate-cookie. The allowcontent rule explicitly states that a content item is allowed to he rendered on the page in its current format. This rule prevents service format changes from causing secure information to he accidently released. The hide rule replaces sensitive information in the content with an uncorrelatcd number of ''I" characters, within a reasonable limit of the original size of the data. Thc obfuscate-well-known rule replaces well-known sensitive information with its description rather than its value. For example, rather than displaying thc user's home address "777 Main Street", the text "HOME AD-DRESS" is displayed. This information is meaningful to the end user, but leaks no useful information to the kiosk.
The obfuscute-mapping rule produces a random table of mappings, stores thc table in the Transient Store, and replaces scnsitivc data with an obscured name from the table. If a trusted devicc is being used in tandem with an untrusted onc, the FCM sends the mapping table to the uscr's trusted dcvicc, so the user can make sense of the obfuscated data. In the stock trading example, to prevent the kiosk from obtaining the list of stocks contained in a portfolio, the FCM applies the obfuscate-mapping rule to the portfolio data. For example, the result could be a table that maps stock Using content filters to obfuscate data names to the names of states (e.g., "IBM" maps to "Kentucky", "AOL" to "Michigan", etc.).
A rule that is similar to the obfuscate-mapping rule is the verifji rule, which leverages the trusted mobile device to verify content displayed on the untrustcd endpoint. The verify rule can be used to make sure that the untrusted devicc does not modify useful public information in a malicious manner. For example, the price of an item on an on-line shopping web site is of dubious value if it can he modified by an untrusted endpoint. The verify rule uses the portable trusted device to display small amounts of data, thereby allowing the user to determine whether thc untrustcd kiosk has tampered with the data. The verfy rule is particularly attractive for mobile devices with cumbersome interfaces as it allows the majority of the interaction to occur on thc rich interface of the untrusted public device.
The obfuscate-form rule removes sensitive information encoded in form fields and hyper-links by generating temporary obfuscated names for form action names, form input fields, and hidden fields for state. Mappings between obfuscated values and actual data are held in the Transient Store. The rule also modifies hyper-links and Java Script in HTML pages containing sensitive session or user data. These transformations are necessary to prevent the leakage of sensitive data to kiosks, as well as to prevent kiosks from being able to post form requests directly to the end scrvicc. The obfuscate-cookie rule performs a similar transformation for any cookies that may be sent to the untrustcd endpoint,
Using content rewriting to reduce the entry of sensitive information
Just as we do not trust endpoints to reccivc sensitive data, we do not want users to enter sensitivc information into untrusted kiosks. Thus, the FCM uses replacement rules to exchange placeholder information with scnsitivc information that is stored only in the trusted infrastructure. There are four rules for content rewriting: replace-well-known, repluce-mapping, replace-form, and replace-cookie, The replace-well-known rule replaces well-known identifiers with the actual data, such as "CREDIT CARD", with thc user's credit card number, and "HOME ADDRESS" with the user's real home addrcss. This typc of form replacement is useful for supporting c-commerce purchase requests that need account numbers and shipping addresses that can't bc entered on untrusted clients. This functionality is also useful for trusted clients as it simplifies the process of filling out forms.
Thc replace-nrapping rules replace obfuscated values with mapped values using information storcd in the Transicnt Store by o/?fuscute-mu/~ping rules (e.g., a user selling a stock cntcrs a U.S. state abhreviation rather than thc stock symbol, and the FCM performs thc reverse mapping).
The replacelform rule is used to replace obfuscated form action namcs, ficld names, and hidden tcxt in HTTP GET/POST requests using mappings previously stored in the Transicnt Store. Thc replace-cookies rule works similarly for cookies.
Using control filtering to protect service functionality
Many services provide information with varying degrees of sensitivity (e.g., looking up a stock quote is much less scnsitive than trading a stock), howevcr, they provide all or nothing access to service functionality, as they assume that the cndpoint is trusted. The proxy infrastructure supports access from untrusted endpoints by providing fine-grain access control over service functionality. The FCM provides this capability using control filtcring rules that control data and commands Rowing from the client to the server. The FCM uses two rules for control filtering: allowconrrol and authorize. The first rule states whether or not a requcst to submit a form or view a page can be transmitted to the end scrvice. In the stock trading example, the control functions on the service's forms and pages (evcn in the split-trust casc) must he explicitly allowed by the profile.
The authorize rule provides fine-grain control over sensitive actions, such as buying stock from an untrustcd endpoint by using an a trustcd device to explicitly authorize the request. In the stock trading example, a request to trade stocks is interceptcd and held by the FCM until authorization is received from the user's trusted companion devicc (e.g., a PDA, cellular telephone, or two-way pager). If a user wants actions to be authorized through a device, they need to first register the authorization device with the infrastructure. Then, when an action is pcrformed that requires confirmation, the FCM will intercept and hold it, and contact the user via the specified device. The trade action is then sent to the device and confirmation is requested. Once it is authorized, the FCM releases the request.
Identity Service (IS)
The Identity Service is the secure repository of persistent data associated with users' trust profiles and their security preferences for access to serviccs. The Identity Service stores the following types of information:
Identities and credentials (e.g., usernamcs, passwords, cncryption keys, etc.) for acccssing secure scrvices.
Rules and preferences for content and control iillering.
0 Personal information (e.g., addresses and account numbers) for automated form filling from untrustcd devices.
Pseudonym identities and onc-time passwords.
0 Service information such as content scraping scripts and XSL style-sheets.
The primary motivation for the Identity Service derives from the need to hide private data from untrusted endpoints, where there is no way for a user to securely transmit private information, The Identity Service provides an alternative where users' passwords and other private information are stored in the infrastructure and merged with any transmission after thc data has left the untrusted device and entered the trusted infrastructure. One could imagine a world in which identity services become a common piece of the puhlic Internet infrastructure. However, until existing Internet serviccs migrate to adopt this functionality our proxy can transparently provide it.
The Identity Service provides additional benefits for users accessing secure services from trusted endpoints. The replication of security credentials on several devices, somc of which may easily be stolen (e.g., small PDAs), increases the probability that credentials may he compromised. It is also unlikely that most users will he savvy enough to understand the security capabilities of several devices, opcrating systems, and filc systems. Similarly, changes to a credcntial require that it he updated on all devices. The IS solves these problems by providing a single source for such data.
Obviously, the security model of the Identity Service must be carefully considered and it must he wellprotected against attacks. We argue that storing the data in one professionally-administered, physically-secured Identity Service is more secure than having it managed across several physically insecure devices by naive end users. Users can control access to their private information in the Identity Service as each of the data entries has an associated Access Control List (ACL).
Transient Store (TS)
The Transient Storc is used to store soft state associated with the current session of the user, such as mappings of obfuscated to original URLs, pending requests for trusted device authorization, or session information. Data can he stored using index keys that are generated by applying a securc hash function (e.g., SHAl [35] ). Secure access can he provided by using cither a large key space such that a key can never be guessed or by performing access control.
Implementation
The design we propose in this paper is a generalization of the ideas we gained from an initial proof of concept implementation of the system. The proof of concept implementation provided access to the Datek Online Stock Trading avoid costly round trips through the potentially thin network to the client device. SSSA Session objects also support The Filter and Control Modifier workers use Sun's SAXP XML parser and apply rules in one pass. Currently, the following subset of rules is implemented: hide, allowcontent, allow-control, and replace-well-known, Rules are specified per profile and can be set by either a text file or through the JSP based UI.
The Identity Service (SUID) is implemented as an API layer on top of a distributed hash-table [21] and works across a cluster. The SUID Worker provides a Ninja RPC interfacc for the specific tasks required by the proxy service to manage user profile information, service transcoding rules, and U1 functionality. Since the state transitions in the SUID are relatively simple, rather than creating a new FSM object for each request, it manages requests internally. The Transient Store is implemented in a similar fashion. The vSpace platform is version two of the Ninja infrastructure for building scalablc, highly available, fault tolerant, cluster based applications. Among the most notable features of vSpace are asynchronous RPC, distributed data structures, and an event driven programming model. Additionally, the vSpace execution environment provides support for load-balancing, and fail-over.
Our proxy service is implcmcntetl as a pipcline of ten vSpace Workers composed through the TaskKompletion asynchronous Ninja RPC mechanism as depicted in figure 2. The vSpace platform is essential for high concurrency performance of the composable pipeline. In thread based RMI cnvironments, blocking interfaces brcak down as threads are tied up on the callers. For example, when object A remotely calls object B that remotely calls object C the thread on A has to wait until the call to C finishes. In the asynchronous task based vSpace environment, the thread becomes frced immediately after object A remotely calls object B. The vSpace platform supports high concurrency with fewer threads and hence less computational overhead do to thread overhead and contcxt switching.
Current worker implementations
In the current implemcntation, Client Side Security Adaptors (CSSA) listen on wcll known ports using asynchronous TCP scrvcr sockets' modificd to support sccurity protocols. Currcntly, SSL is supported, using Sun's JSSE library, as well as 21 shared key protocol based on Blowfish. SSSA session ohjects handlc HTTP rcdircctions directly to
Discussion
Our initial design changcd little during the implementation phasc. The most notable change is using the WebL scripting language to create a generic Server Side Downstream FT componcnt, a capability that requires the storage of service-specific information, such as WebL scraping scripts and XSL style sheets, in the Idcntity Service. A future change would he to separate out the XSL rendering and web scraping functionality into individual workers, rather than having the functionality embedded in the FT worker state machines. The further decomposition will create useful building blocks for other Ninja scrviccs. It will also makc it easy to replace thc workers with alternative web scraping and XSL tools.
Another intcrcsting lesson learned in the current implenicntation is the need to provide pluggable protocol parsing in thc sccurity adaptors. We found the CSSAWapSession to be a useful place to do pre-proccssing of parsing 01 headers for protocols and gathering data packets. 
Adding support for new device formats
Overall, the current implementation consists of approximately 26,000 lines of commented Java source. The management user interface is 2,100 lines of JSP code. Yahoo Contest and Yahoo Mail combined arc 1,400 and 1,600 lincs of XSL and WcbL code respectively.
Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our proxy-based approach to secure multi-modal acccss to Internct content from post-pc dcvices. The evaluation criteria are: case of adding support for new scrvices, case of supporting new clicnt formats, and overall performance of the system. As test cases, we use a service that providcs secure access to Yahoo Contest [22] , a stock trading simulator.
Adding new services
Adding support for a new service mcrely requires writing a site map, WebL scripts for each of the services pages, and a dcfault rule set. Our implementation ofproxied multimodal access to Yahoo Contcst service consists of five cow tent pagcs: holdings, orderconfirmation, orderForm, orderverification, and quotes. We also use a shared page that we include in each of these pages. The site map consists of the service name and unique page identifiers for each page.
A service author creates WebL scripts for each page and stores them in the SUID. The holdings page requires the most scraping and consists of a 250 line WcbL script. Figure 3 displays the original Yahoo Contest holdings pagc. Writing the Yahoo Contest scraping scripts took three weeks of part time effort in a pass-fail course by an undergraduate unfamiliar with WebL. After gaining fatniliarity with WebL, authoring service scraping scripts became a simple task that was done in a few days.
The following example illustrates the dcfault rulc set for the tags €ound on the holdings pagc of Yahoo Contest. Only Adding support for a new client device requires writing an XSL style sheet to rendcr the content for that device. Security adaptors need to be implcmented, if they do not already exist for the desired sccurity protocol. Howevcr, since security adaptation and content adaptation functionality is separated in our design, security adaptors can be re-used and only necd to he written once per new client format. Figure 4 shows the modified vcrsion of' the holdings page after the security transformation rules have been applied. Figure 5 shows the corrcsponding WML version of the holdings page. The figures illustrate multiple device lusion for service access, as sensitive information hidden from the kiosk is displaycd on the trusted PDA.
Two XSL style sheets are used to rendcr the holdings page. The first gcnerates an HTML represcntation for use by either a securc home machine, or a web-based kiosk. The second generatcs a WML representation that can be viewed on mobile dcvices with WML browsers. The HTML style sheet was casy to author based on thc site's original HTML presentation. The WML style shect is a simplc adaptation of the HTML style sheet. For thc holdings page, thc HTML and WML style sheets are 370 and 100 lines respectively, plus a shared file of 100 lines.
As illustrated in the examples, adding support for an additional device format only requires writing a short XSL style shcet to output the content in a suitable format for that device. This powerful capability allows content authors LISing the proxy to tailor the content for device screen layout and other factors. Additionally, the semantically tagged reprcscntation cnables powerful transformations such as meaningful text-to-speech synthesis of the XML content. However, these hcnclits come at a cost, with a trade-off versus the automated approach taken by other proxies such as ProxiNet for delivering content to PDAs. The ProxiNet approach docs not rcquire any stylc sheets and performs generic transformations of HTML into its custom thin client browser format. Thus, instant acccss to any web-site is provided to PDAs that run its browser. However, gcneric approachs do not offcr the ability for content authors to customize pages for small devices, or do transformations such as voice rendering. To cnable RCCCSS to more services, we could provide thc functionality of the ProxiNet approach by bypassing the semantic transformation laycr. However, this would disable the fine-grain access control, contentfiltering, and multiplc dcvice fiision capabilities.
Performance
Performance was measured in two configurations. The first consisted of all the workers running on a single node. The second consistcd of the workers distributed across the cluster, each node running one worker.
Both o l thesc experiments were performed on the UCBerkeley Millennium cluster [6] . Each cluster node has two 500 MHz Intel Pcntium 111 processors with 512KB cache, 512 MB of RAM, two 9 GB disks, and a 100 Mbls Ethernet connection. The nodes run Red Hat Linux vcrsion 6.0 release 2.2.5. The Java environmcnt is Sun's JDK 1.2.2 production release for Linux running with green threads and thc Inprise just in time compiler'.
For the experiments, a client used thc proxy to request the holdings and quotes page 20 times each. The cold start run exhibited extremely high latencics (more than an order of magnitude higher than the average times after warmup). These results can be attributed to Java class loading and initial JIT compilation. As a result, the averagc times only includc warm runs. During the experiments, thc vSpace workers were run with minimal logging.
The singlc nodc configuration returned pagcs in an avcrage of 3.75 seconds. Thc holdings and quotes pages round trip times (including authentication and redirections to the Yahoo scrvicc) avcraged 4.28 s and 3.23 s respectively .
The long latency is causcd by incfliciencies in the current implementation, Thc workers exec new proccsscs for WebL (331.3 ms) and Xalan (99.94 ms). Inefficicncies in the size and serialization of the format transcoder collection also contributcs to this time duc to the slow read from disk and repeated serializations. The disk writes also affected thc storage components for temporary state as the DDS uses two phasc commit. A large portion, 3 4 . 8 2 %, of the round trip timc is not accounted for by thesc mcasurcments. Factors that contribute to this time arc task dispatch Java serialization timc, qucuc wait time, and debug output. An optimizcd implementation should be able to make a substantial improvcinent in the latcncy of the proxy.
The distributed configuration performed in a similar manner. Pages were returned in 3.87 s on average. Thc round trip times for the holdings and quotes pagcs wcre 4.18 3The current Java envisoninent only supports n single processor Figure 5 . Yahoo Contest holdings WML s and 3.5.5 s respectively. Wc cxpccted thc distributed version to outpcrform thc singlc nodc as wc observed the Java based proxy to be memory and CPU intensivc during development on smaller workstations. However, the resources for the single millennium node proved adequate for this benchmark. Thc proxy was clearly U0 hound in this environmcnt.
The distributed configuration displayed considerablc tolerance to faults. Workers sometimes caused the JVM running the vSpacc to crash. Whcn the JVM was restartcd, the system recovered graccfully with a higher latency for the initial class loading and compiling of the rcstartcd worker. Future versions of vSpacc, which will include automatic rcstart of workcrs, can takc advantage of the properties of this configuration.
At the time of this writing, thc current implementation is not stable cnough to perform scalability experiments. Scalability results will bc obtained after further optimization and cleanup of our proxy servicc, and the vSpacc platlorm. We hypothesize thc distributed configuration will have a highcr throughput than the singlc node configuration.
Discussion
Overall, our proxy approach allows considerablc customization capabilities and easy scaling to multiple dcvices and scrviccs. Thc devclopment effort required is minimal: the simple authoring of WebL scripts for content scraping and XSL style shects for device specific rendering. This development work can be donc by an independent scrvice provider running the proxy, and spccializing in this work, rather than waiting for end services to provide support for multiple devices. Alternatively, contcnt providers can provide contcnt in an XML representation to hypass wcbscraping and enable the content-filtering and digital wallet capabilities provided by the proxy.
In our experience, the timc to author components for new protocols and stylc shccts for new devices is minimal. The CSSAWapSession and WML pages for Yahoocontest were written in a few days on top of the existing implementation. This included the time to learn WML and discover the differences between the WML browser protocol and HTTP. Additionally, scraping the web site and generating a XML representation is also minimal. Support for the Yahoo Mail service was added in a few days. The user interface for customization of rules for user profiles should make it easy for users to choose a content and control filtering level they feel comfortable with from their mode of access.
The current implementation was developed on a prototype version of the Ninja vSpace platform. The majority of thc development effort to get the current version running consisted of understanding the vSpace programming model and flushing out hugs in the prototype platform. Without time for optimization, the initial performance numbers of a 3 second latency are promising. Our experience with fault recovery in the distributed configuration also shows promise. Now that the platform is stabilizing, we should he able to significantly improve our performance, stability, and scalability using the understanding we gained in building the current implementation.
An open issue is the psychological acceptability of our approach. Mobile commerce is just starting to hit the public. Will mobile users be satisfied with the cumbersome interfaces of small devices or trusting of public tcrminals in the environment? One may argue that people aren't as concerned enough with privacy (or aware enough) as they are willing to use shopper affinity cards, revealing detailed purchase histories to supermarkets in exchange for saving a few dollars. However, we feel these same users will bc sensitive and concerned when access to credit accounts and other personal information required to complete a commerce transaction are at stake. We also [eel that these sensitive users will find the act of connecting to the proxy service and authenticating with one-time passwords an acceptable part of their mobile commerce routine.
Related work
Several related projects have focused on data filtering at different levels of granularity for increased security. Wiederhold and Billelo [381 examine the problem of protccting the release of data from databases for collaboration purposes, where the internal databases are notorganized according to external access criteria. The authors note that, in these environments, traditional authentication and authorization tools and secure transmission fail to protect the release of inappropriate data. They propose a solution hased upon a rule-driven security-mediator that performs resultchecking to filter both queries and, more importantly, their results. Their rules for filtering query results contain traditional role-based access control, site blocking, and more advanced features, such as the replacement of query result components with non-identifying (obfuscated) terms.
Our architecture's approach to content and control filtering is based upon having specific semantic knowledge of the service data and control actions that are being filtered or modified. However, such an approach does not work for protecting unstructured information, such as the content of e-mail messages. Instead, we believe that we could apply techniques from medical research that focus on generalizing, substituting, and removing information from medical data to protect privacy without obscuring "important" details of the data [36] .
Related to our idea of multiple device fusion is the notion of splitting trust between PCs and mobile devices to increase security [5]. In the split trust paradigm, an application's security crucial parts execute on a small trusted device, while other parts execute on a more powerful, but untrusted device. The authors explore the split trust paradigm in the context of e-mail using a Palm Pilot as a PKCSl 1 smart card for Netscape Communicator. Our architecture employs a similar technique in thc network using out-ofband channels between the trusted and untrusted devices.
Another related project is the work by the World Wide Web Consortium on the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [ 181 and the associated preference exchange language -APPEL [27] . P3P provides a standard means for service providers to disclose their practices regarding the collection and dissemination of personal information and allows users to make informed decisions regarding the use of this information. This research is primarily focused on protecting the information sent from users to services, varying from click-stream data to users' personal information, such as names and addresses. We explore the inverse of this problem: allowing users to express their preferences about the type of data to he displayed and the functionality to he allowed as a function of the users' access device. Also related to this research area are trust-management systems, such as KeyNote [7] , that serve as engines for applications to determine whether or not a potentially dangerous operation conforms to a user's security policy.
Our infrastructure-based proxy model is also related to research on proxies to more efficiently use network resources, reduce cost, and increase security focusing on filtering to optimize performance along the last link in mobile environments [2, 40, 411 . Similar to these works, we stress thc ease of deploying an intermediary instead of changing the protocols at end points and place considerable trust in the proxy.
Related systems have examined the problem of managing different types of identity data; for example, Apple's KeyChain [41 stores all username-password pairs locally on the client PC. Lucent's web proxy, ProxyMate [28] , takes this capability a step further by generating stronger user ID'S and passwords transparently to the user, and using thcm to login to the actual site. Novell's DigitalMe [31] and Yodlee [39] store passwords on a ccntral server4. Microsolt's Passport (301 service a s wcll as other e-wallet services hold pcrsonally idcntifying information to simplify form filling in e-commcrcc transactions. This functionality is similar to our architccturc; however, wc make such information always availablc by kccping it in thc intrastructure, rather than on a uscr's end device. CommcrccNct's IdentitySafe [ 1 I ] providcs uscrs with pseudo identities for purchasing from online incrchants and only releases personally identifiable information to sites on a need to know basis.
Our application of security protocol adaptation is dcrived from thc idcas presented in [23] , which suggcsted that security transformations for small devices would be desirable and presented proxy-bascd access to Kerberizcd services. Their design placcs the bulk of Kerbcros authentication work on an infrastructurc-based proxy, providing indirect authentication of clients and simplifying the requircmcnts of small devices.
Finally, to format contcnt for a range of dcviccs with limited display capabilities, wc could lcverage relatcd rcscarch, such as TACC [ 16, 171. By abstracting device functionality into the client-side Format Transcoder, we simplify the process of adding ncw types of dcvices. In addition, the Wireless Application Protocol(WAP) [37] prescnts a standard format for small devices. Othcr rclated work in this arca includcs Oracle's Portal-To-Go which promises any service to any device access [32] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we prcscnt a novel infrastructurc-hased architccture for providing sccure multi-modal access to widcarca services. The architccture uses rulc-driven content and security transformation functions to enable access from a widc variety of cnd dcviccs by decoupling device capabilities from servicc requirements. This approach grcatly simplifies and rcduces the amount of work required to support a new dcvicc or servicc.
Providing acccss to a new scrvicc merely requircs writing a WebL script to scrape the contcnt into an XML rcpresentation. Our example stock scrvice consists of 6 scripts totaling 1000 lincs. After gaining familiarity with WebL, support for the Yahoo Mail scrvicc was addcd in a few days.
Yahoo Mail support consists of 5 scripts totaling 610 lines.
Support for new dcvicc formats is casily providcd by writing XSL style sheets. For HTML, thc most complcx 'Thcsc systems provide conveniencc, but do not enhaocc security from untrusted endpoints, as thc inaster password still iiccds lo he entered and thus, call be caplured or hijacked by the untrusted endpoint. In contrast, our architccture's Identity Service provides one-time passwords and line-grain control ovcr security.
format, therc arc I100 lincs of code total in all of the stylc sheets for Yahoo Contcst. Yahoo Mail requires 360 lincs rcspcctivcly. Adding support for the WML browser and style shccts for WML pagcs only required a couple of days cflort. The custom WML version of the holdings page was adapted from the HTML version and is only 100 lines comparcd to thc 370 used for HTML tables. Although some developmcnt is required, this approach allows considcrable customization capabilitics. Furthermore, it provides thc ability to support interesting formats such as custom WML and voice access which have yct to bc scen from generic HTML transf'ormation proxies.
The currcnt implementation rcturns pagcs in an average time of approximately 3-4 seconds. The implementation has not yet becn optimized and there are many opportunities for improvemcnt. Implementing the system as a vSpace service requircd a stcep learning curve initially. However, the clustcr widc management of persistent state provided by thc DDS, and auto-discovery of workers are very valuable building blocks. Experimenting with vSpacc V I workcrs in the distributed configuration showed promising fault tolerance results. We are looking forward to the added fcatures provided by vSpacc v2.
We provide a generic "any dcvicc to any scrvice" modcl that is in stark contrast to the traditional approaches of vertical scrvicc and device integration and implemcntation. Our hypothesis is that such a generic modcl provides rapid support for new deviccs and services, a critical requirement for the Post-PC cra.
Furthermore, the architccture also supports a new model of securc intcraction from untrusted public Intcrnet access points found in mobile environments. To our knowledge, our architecture is the first to address this intcraction model. By providing a generic control and content rewriting capability, thc architecture provides users with prccise control over thc exposure of information, both as a function of their acccss dcviccs and as a function of the uscrs' adopted roles. Additionally, the architccture supports the fusion of multiple devices, using trusted portable devices for sccure authorization of scnsitive rcquests. Further non-sccurity relatcd applications of multiple devicc fusion could allow voicc access to a scrvice via the car, displaying graphical information on a passenger's PDA.
